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I.

ARGUMENT

Defendant North Idaho Resorts, LLC ("NIR")appealed the dish·ict court's award of
discretionary costs and some costs as a matter of right against NIR because the district court
failed to comply with the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law
interpreting those rules, and therefore, abused its discretion. NIR's appeal is based upon the
district court's memorandum decision and order awarding costs, and focuses upon what was and
was not said by the district court in making its award against NIR. Respondent Valiant Idaho,
LLC ("Valiant") urges this Court to uphold the district court's award of costs not because of the
reasoning and explanation provided by the district court in suppo1i of its decision, but because of
the reasoning and explanation it believes the district comi could have offered in supp01i of its
award.
Review of the district court's award and comparison with the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure and Idaho case law reveals that the district comi failed to comply with the applicable
civil procedure rule and failed to act consistent with the applicable legal standards, and in so
doing, abused its discretion.

A.

NIR FILED A TIMELY OBJECTION TO VALIANT'S COST MEMORANDUM
AND VALIANT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CONTEST TIMELINESS OF NIR'S
OBJECTION TO VALIANT'S COST REQUEST
The Comi should reject Valiant's contention that NIR waived its right to object to Valiant's

memorandum of costs and fees because Valiant failed to raise this issue below, and in fact waived
its right to do so. Additionally, Valiant failed to properly raise this issue as an additional issue on
appeal. Moreover, the district court properly recognized NIR's objection to the cost and fee
memorandum despite the captioning of the objection.

1

Idaho Appellate Rule 15(a) requires that when an issue raised by a respondent does not
seek "affirmative relief... by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order,"
an issue may be "presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4)
without filing a cross-appeal." IAR 35(b)(4) states ifrespondent contends that the issues presented
on appeal are "insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review, the respondent may"
raise those additional issues "in the same form prescribed in Rule 35(a)(4)."
Regarding issues on appeal, this Cmnt has consistently held that it "will not consider issues
that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902
(2001); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)( 6), the applicable rule at the time the costs were
requested, required a party to object to a memorandum of costs (including attorney fees) within 14
days of service of the memorandum of costs. "Failure to timely object to the items in the
memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the ~osts claimed." Id. As cited by
the Respondent, this Court in some instances has strictly applied the consequence of waiver of an
untimely objection. See Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,
475-76, 36 P.3d 218, 227-28 (2001). However, this Court has allowed an enlargement of time for
filing a memorandum of costs under Rule 54 when good cause was shown for the untimely filing.
See Estate o/Hollandv. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 102-03, 279 P.3d 80, 88-89

(2012); Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286,289,596 P.2d 798, 801 (1979).
Regardless, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure also require that the courts first consider
the interest of justice when confronted with minor deficiencies in court filings.
Rule 1(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires "These rules should be construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
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proceeding." Rule 8(e) mandates, "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice." Also, Rule
61 requires the comis to disregard e1Tors and defects in the interest of justice when they do not
affect any paiiy's substantial rights:
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or
any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for
setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all
errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.
IRCP 61 (emphasis added). Indeed, "Rule 61 essentially embodies the precept that an appellate
court will not grant relief for haimless error. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310,
317,870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, Valiant never raised the issue below that NIR had failed to timely object to
Valiant's memorandum of costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(5). Valiant filed its memorandum of costs
on July 6, 2016. R Vol XLI, pp. 5019-5057. An opposition to that memorandum of costs was filed
on July 20, 2016, by NIR's counsel. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5503-5520. Thus, there is no legitimate
ai·gument that the July 20, 2016, opposition was not timely. The only question is whether the July
20, 2016, opposition provided adequate it was filed on behalf ofNIR despite its caption. It was,
and the paiiies and the district comi all treated it that way.
Valiant's opposition to that objection recognized that despite the error in that pleading's
title, it was obvious that the pleading was filed on behalf of both NIR and VP: "VP Inc. 's
Opposition to Valiant Idaho's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees ("VP Objection") was
filed, presumably on behalf of both VP and NIR." R Vol. XLVII, p. 5747. In fact, Valiant's
footnote on that saine page removes any doubt whether Valiant recognized it as a filing made by
NIR:
Valiant notes that the caption and opening paragraph of the objection filed by
Jaines, Vernon & Weeks, PA does not indicate it is filed on behalf of North Idaho
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Resorts, LLC ("NIR") as well as VP, Inc. ("VP"). However, as the body of the
objection advances arguments on behalf ofNIR and VP, Valiant assumes that
the Court will treat the objection as having been filed on behalf of both NIR
and VP.
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5747 (emphasis added).

Valiant failed to object at that time to NIR's

involvement in the July 20, 2016, objection. Instead, Valiant addressed the merits of the objection.
The district court followed suit and did not find the e1Tor in title of the July 20, 2016, objection to
be a waiver ofNIR to object to Valiant's cost memorandum. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829-5843.
Now in opposition to NIR's appeal Valiant asks the Court to uphold the district court's
award of discretionary costs against NIR because NIR failed to object below. Valiant also asks
the Court to strictly construe IRCP 54(d)(5) against NIR the same as this Court has strictly
construed the requirements of IRCP 4(b )(2) in the context of extending time for service of process
upon a showing of cause. Respondent's Brief, 10; compare Harrison v. Ed Of Prof'l Discipline,
145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (strictly construing timeliness requirements for
service of process). NIR submits that the requirement of"good cause" to extend time for service
is not a requirement in construing pleadings to do justice and addressing the merits, rather than the
f01m, of pleadings.
This Court should not consider Valiant's contention that NIR waived its right to object to
Valiant's award of costs and fees because Valiant failed to raise that issue below. Not only did
Valiant fail to raise the issue below, it commented on the captioning e1Tor in the title of the July
20, 2016, objection and recognized the substantive arguments objecting to an award of costs to
Valiant were presented on behalf of both VP and NIR. Furthetmore, Valiant failed to raise this
alleged deficiency as an additional issue on appeal. Lastly, a decision by this Court construing the
etTor in the title of the July 20, 2016, objection as NIR's waiver of its right to object to Valiant's
cost memorandum would exalt fotm over substance and ignore the interests of justice in
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adjudicating the parties' substantial rights on the merits. Therefore, this Court should reject
Valiant's argument that NIR waived its right to contest its cost and fee award.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS AGAINST
NIR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
The district court abused its discretion in awarding Valiant discretionary costs against

NIR because the district court's award did not comply with the rules of civil procedure and was
inconsistent with applicable legal standards.
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the trial court discretion to award discretionary
costs "on a showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and
should in the interest ofjustice be assessed against the adverse paiiy." IRCP 54( d)(l )(D) (emphasis
added).

The rule lists each of these four characteristics (necessary, exceptional, reasonably

incmTed, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party) in the
conjunctive, meaning a cost must satisfy each characteristic,
The prevailing patiy maldng a claim for discretionary costs has the burden "to make an
adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred,
and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse pmiy." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v.

Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (1993); Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho
918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991); Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643
(1991). Only after the prevailing pmiy successfully meets is burden, the trial court "must make
express findings as to why the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed," after
an objection by an opposing paiiy. IRCP 54(d)(l )(D).
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"This Court exercises free review of the district court's compliance with the mies of civil
procedure in awarding costs and attorney fees." Hoaglandv. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900,913,303
P.3d 587,600 (2013); J.R. Simplotv. Chemetics Int'!, 130 Idaho 255,257,939 P.2d 574,576
(1997). This Court reviews an award of discretionary costs under the abuse of discretion
standard and employs the following three-step inquiry to determine if the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding discretionary costs: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
determination through an exercise ofreason." Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. DeBest

Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186, 983 P.2d 834,840 (1999).
The district court's award of discretionary costs in this case not only failed to comply
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but also was an abuse of discretion because the district
court failed to recognize its decision was one of discretion and then made an award inconsistent
with applicable legal standards.

1.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs
without Acknowledgiug its Award was Discretionary

The district comi' s award of discretionary costs against NIR was an abuse of discretion
because the comi never acknowledged it was an issue of discretion. If a trial co111i fails to correctly
perceive the issue of awarding discretionary costs as discretionary, it has abused its discretion.

Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho at 186, 983 P.2d at 840.
The fact that the district court used the word "authorizes" once and the word "should" as it
repeatedly recited the general standard set forth in IRCP 54(d)(l )(D), as well as the term
"discretionary cost" repeatedly, does not evidence that the court perceived its award of
discretionary costs was in fact discretionary.
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When this Court reviews a trial court's award of discretionary costs to determine whether
the trial court perceived the issues as one of discretion, this Court finds unequivocal statements of
the trial court acknowledging their discretion dispositive. For instance, a trial court's statement
"[t]he decision to grant or refuse permission to amend is left to the sound discretion of the court.... "
acts as evidence that the trial court correctly perceived its discretion. DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title
Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749,755,331 P.3d 491,497 (2014). A district court's statement it has "broad

discretion in determining whether or not to grant or deny a motion for new trial" in its order
denying that motion also evidences that court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441,448 (2003). Indeed, this first step

in the analysis of abuse of discretion is overcome when the trial comt makes specific
aclmowledgement that it is exercising its discretion: "In its ruling denying Fish discretionary costs,
the trial court specifically acknowledged that it was exercising its discretion in reviewing Fish's
request for discretionary costs." Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998).
In this case, the district court never communicated any recognition that the discretionary
award of costs it awarded was actually a matter of discretion, nor that it intended to act within the
outer boundaries of that discretion. To the contrary, the district comt only acknowledged that Rule
54(d)(l )(D) authorizes the award of discretionary costs "on a showing that the costs were
necessary and exceptional costs, reasonable incurred, and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." R Vol. Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838-5839 (emphasis in the
original).
The trial court's award of discretionm·y costs focused on the necessity of the costs and only
mentioned discretion when using the tenn "discretionary costs." Respondents point out that the
district court used the word "should" as evidence that the court recognized the issue as one of
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discretion, yet each of the district court's six (6) uses of the word "should" was only used when
reciting and paraphrasing the language ofIRCP 54(d)(l)(D): "should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." For instance, the court stated "The Court finds that the scope
and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary and exceptional costs which Valiant should
be awarded in the interests of justice." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839 (emphasis added). However, the
district court's repeated used of the phrasing of IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) does not evidence that it
c01Tectly perceived the issues of awarding discretionary costs as one of discretion and the distTict
court never made such an acknowledgement.
The clear message that resonates from the district court's memorandum decision and order,
after recognizing the repetition of the Rule 54(d)(l )(D) language in a conclusory fashion, is that
the court awarded Valiant discretionary costs because they were necessary and otherwise
unprovided for as costs as a matter of right:
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice,
because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a
matter of right."
R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839-40 (emphasis added). The district court made no express statement that
it perceived the issue as one of discretion and its overarching reasoning for the award of
discretionary costs also fails to evidence it correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion. Thus,
it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to award Valiant discretionary costs against NIR.
2.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs
because it Made the Award without Valiant Requiring Valiant make the
Prerequisite Showing Required by the Rules of Civil Procedure

The district court abused its discretion when it awarded Valiant discretionary costs because
Valiant failed to make the necessary prerequisite showing that the costs it claimed were exceptional
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and should in the interests of justice be awarded against NIR. "This Court exercises free review
of the district comi's compliance with the rules of civil procedure in awarding costs and attorney
fees." Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 913, 303 P.3d at 600; J.R. Simplot, 130 Idaho at 257, 939 P.2d at
576.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(D) requires the prevailing paiiy claiming

discretionary costs to first make a showing that each of the discretionai-y costs was I) necessary,
2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should in the interest of justice be assessed against
the adverse party. "The burden is on the prevailing paiiy to make an adequate initial showing that
these costs were necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of
justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy." Jackson, 124 Idaho at 880, 865 P .2d 965 at 971;
Westfall, 120 Idaho at 926, 821 P.2d at 981; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. Thus,
according to the plain language of the rule, if the movant doesn't make the requisite showing, the
award should not be made. The district court failed to comply with Rule 54(d)(l )(D) because it
awarded Valiant discretionary costs without Valiant making the necessary initial showing.
Valiant' s response memorandum misstates the initial burden it bore as the prevailing paiiy
requesting discretionary costs: "NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing
to make any showing the costs were exceptional and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed
against NIR." Respondent's Brief, 12. In that statement Valiant fails to acknowledge that it had
the initial burden of showing the costs were 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred,
and 4) should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy. Valiant completely

failed to meet that burden. Thus, it was etrnr for the dish-ict comi to make the award as well as an
abuse of discretion.
Review of Valiant's memorandum of costs and attorneys' fees and its memorandum in
opposition to NIR's objection reveals that Valiant failed to make its required initial showing that
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the discretionary costs were both exceptional and should be assessed against NIR in the interests
of justice.
a.

Legal Standard of an "Exceptional Cost"

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l )(D) does not define what it means for a cost to be
"exceptional." However, the Idaho cases addressing this concept have developed two ways of
defining an exceptional cost. The first, is that a cost is exceptional if it arises in a case that is itself
exceptional and the second is if the cost is uncommon for the type of case.
Looking first to the exceptional cost because the case itself is exceptional, "This Court has
always construed the requirement that a cost be 'exceptional' under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(D) to include
those costs incun-ed because the nature of the case was itself exceptional." Hayden Lake Fire Prat.
Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). This Court has recently clarified
this standard and better defined what analysis a district court must engage in and what explanation
a district court must provide if it determines a case is exceptional, maldng all resultant costs
exceptional:
Over the years, this Court and the Court of Appeals have been inconsistent with
handling discretionary costs. Compare, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v.
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (holding expert witness fees
can be exceptional), and In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho
527,545, 199 P.3d 102, 121 (2008) (upholding award of discretionary costs on the
dish·ict comt's finding discretionary costs were equitable and just), and Puckett v.
Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169, 158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007) (permitting discretionary
cost for expert witness in medical malpractice case based on the long course of
litigation), with, e.g., Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354, 256 P.3d 755,
762 (2011) (holding that case was not exceptional merely because an expett was
necessary), and City ofMcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588-89, 130 P.3d 1118,
1126-27 (2006) (holding intervenor costs were not exceptional but were "routine
costs associated with modern litigation overhead"), and Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho
492, 493-94, 960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998) (finding hiring of expert for accident
reconstruction was routine). We therefore clarify that numerous complaints,
depositions, and expert testimony does not render a case in and of itself exceptional.
Rather, courts should assess the context and nature of a case as a whole along
with multiple circumstances. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at
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762. The mere fact numerous experts were retained or numerous amendments
were filed does not standing alone render a case exceptional. Particular
standards a court should consider include, but are not limited to, whether
there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was an unneces·sary
waste of time, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary
costs that could have been easily avoided. Most importantly, however, a court
should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional.
Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 914,303 P.3d at 601 (bold and underline emphasis added). Therefore, for

costs to be exceptional because the case itself is exception, the district court must explain why the
circumstances of the case render it exceptionaL
The second way a cost is dete1mined to be "exceptional" is if it uncommon in the particular
type of case. For instance, costs for copy, travel and expert witness fees in a personal injury case
are not "exceptional" because they "are considered ordinary" in that type of case. Alcorn, 141
Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. Under the same standard, "routine costs associated with modern
litigation overhead" are not exceptional costs. Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,384,973 P.2d 148,
155 (1999). For the same reason this Comi has rejected an award of discretionaiy costs for expert
witness fees in a medical-malpractice case because it is a cost that is ordinary in both proving and
defending such a claim. Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354--55, 256 P.3d 755, 762-63
(201 T). Thus, the standard in Idaho is settled that a cost is not exceptional unless it is 1) the result
of a case that is itself exceptional, or 2) uncommon in the particular type of case.
b.

Valiant Failed to Make a Showing that its Claimed Discretionai-y Costs
Were Exceptional

Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees never attempted to show that the
discretionary costs it claimed against NIR were either exceptional or should in the interests of
justice be assessed against NIR. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5055. Instead, that memorandum simply
labeled the costs as exceptional and stated they should be awarded in the interests of justice. No
reasoning was provided for either classification. Valiant never made a showing that the case itself
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was exceptional, nor that the costs were uncommon for this type of action. To the contrary, Valiant
simply argued that these costs were necessary, not otherwise provided as costs as a matter of right,
and therefore, should be awarded. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5053 .1
In Valiant's reply to NIR's objection to an award of discretionary costs it clarified its
position on why the claimed costs were "exceptional":
As discussed, NIR and VP' s defense of this lawsuit was frivolous. As such, all of
the discretionary costs for which Valiant seeks recovery in the Valiant foreclosure
action (other than the litigation guarantee) should be deemed exceptional. It is the
exceptional case in which a party acts frivolously. Therefore, once the Court finds
that NIR and VP defended this case frivolously, it follows that all the costs incurred
because of those frivolous defenses are exceptional and recoverable as
discretionary costs.
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. As set forth above, the showing Valiant made to the district court was that
the costs were exceptional because the case itself was exceptional due to the frivolous claims made
by each defendant. However, the district court s_quarely rejected this position: "this Court does not

believe that JV, NIR, or VP defended this action frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation."
R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5837.

Therefore, Valiant never made the prerequisite showing that its

discretionary costs were exceptional, making the district court's award of discretionary costs an
abuse of discretion and out of compliance with Rule 54(d)(l )(D).
C.

Legal Standard when an Award should be Assessed in the Interests of
Justice

This Court has provided guidance on what analysis should take place when determining
whether discretionary costs should be awarded against an adverse patty as follows:
In determining whether an award of attorney fees is in the interest of justice,
a court should consider the overall conduct of the lawsuit and balance that
conduct against the American Rule, which presumes that each party is
1 The argument presented by Valiant in the last paragraph of page 5052 and continued on the top of page 5052 is
almost identical to the language found in pages 5839-5840 of the district court's decision. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 58395840.
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responsible for their own attorney fees and costs. See Caldwell v. Idaho Youth
Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 P.2d 215,222 (1998). Factors to consider include
but are not limited to the merits of the lawsuit and whether or not it was pursued
frivolously, see I.R.C.P. 11; the relationship of the costs incurred to the final
disposition of the proceeding, and the value added to the proceeding by the costs
incurred, see Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475,
36 P.3d 218,227 (2001); the necessity of the proceedings to the final resolution of
the lawsuit; and the behavior of the parties, and whether they needlessly ran up
costs and fees. Justice is not dependent upon one's wealth or ability to pay costs;
as such, this is one factor that should not be considered in this analysis.

Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 915-16, 303 P.3d at 602-03 (emphasis added). Indeed, this Court has

also instrncted that the beginning point of analysis is "the presumption that it is in the interest of
justice for each party to pay their own costs unless the overall conduct of the lawsuit indicates
otherwise." Id.
d.

Valiant Failed to Make a Showing that its Claimed Discretionary Costs
Should be Assessed Against NIR in the Interests of Justice

With respect to a showing of why any of the discretionary costs should be assessed against
NIR in the interests of justice, Valiant never attempted to make that showing.

Neither its

memorandum of costs and fees, nor its opposition to NIR's objection addresses why the interests
of justice would have the discretionary costs assessed against NIR rather than borne by Valiant as
prescribed by the American Rule. Because IRCP 54(d)(l )(D) requires the prevailing party to first
make a showing satisfying the elements of the rnle (i.e. that the costs are exceptional and should
in the interests of justice be assessed by the adverse party) before an award of discretionary costs
is made, and Valiant failed to make that showing, the district court's award of discretionary costs
did not comply with the mies of civil procedure in awarding discretionary costs. This failure to
comply with the Rule was also an abuse of discretion because the award is inconsistent with
applicable legal standards.
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3.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs
because it Failed to make Express Findings that the Discretionary Costs
Were Exceptional as Defined by Idaho Law.

The district court's award of discretionary costs against NIR was an abuse of discretion
because the district cou1t failed to ever explain why the costs were exceptional. To act within its
discretion in making an award of discretionary costs the court "must make express findings as to
why the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." IRCP 54(d)(l )(D). "Express
findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary,
reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this
requirement." Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168.
As set fmth above in Section B.2.a. and incorporated herein by reference, a cost can be
exceptional for one of two reasons: first, because it results from a case that is itself exception, or
2) because it is uncommon in an action of this type. If a trial court makes the detennination that
the case itself is exceptional, it is incumbent on the trial comt to "explain why the circmnstances
of a case render it exceptional." Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601 (emphasis in
original).
In this case, the memorandum decision and order awarding discretionary costs against NIR
is completely devoid of any finding by the district court that the case itself was exceptional, much
less any explanation of why the circmnstances of this case render it exceptional. Similarly, the
district court's opinion contains no express findings that any of the awarded discretionary costs
are exceptional because they are uncommon in a commercial mmtgage foreclosure action. To
rehabilitate the district court's opinion, Valiant presents the Comt with various reasons it believes
this case was exceptional. However, this Court's review is limited to the decision of the district
court rendered in its memorandum decision and order.
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The district court's decision contains no such findings or explanations. Each of the district
court's uses of the te1m "exceptional" is completely conclusory. For example, the district court's
treatment of an award of discretionary costs for witness fees provides no meaningful findings or
explanation as to the exceptional nature of the fees: "The witness fees Valiant paid in excess of
the $20.00 per day were necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest
of justice be assessed against the defendants." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. The statement begs the
question "Why?" Why are these fees "exceptional?" The district court provides no accompanying
findings or explanation.
Review of each of the itemized discretionary costs (i.e. items 1 through 5 on pages 58405841) leaves the same question unanswered: "Why are these costs exceptional?" Idaho case law
does not define a cost as exceptional just because the district court says it is. An exceptional cost
is either 1) one that arises from a case that is itself exceptional, or 2) a cost that is uncommon in
that pruticular type of case. Judge Buchanan failed to make either determination with respect to
any of the discretionary costs it awarded against NIR. In fact, Judge Buchanan failed to malce any
express findings that the costs were exceptional, other than conclusory statements that simply
paiToted the IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) language. Therefore, the district comt abused its discretion by
awai·ding discretionary costs without ever making findings, with explanation, that any of these
costs are exceptional as defined by Idaho law.

4.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs
because it Failed to Make Express Findings that the Discretionary Costs
should be Awarded Against NIR in the Interests of Justice.

The district court abused its discretion because it failed to find that discretionary costs
should be awarded against NIR in the interests of justice. As set fmth above, Valiant makes
considerable effmt to set f01th each of the findings the district court could have made to support a
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conclusion that this case is exceptional in nature. However, the district court made none of those
findings and never concluded that this case was exceptional. Curiously, Valiant never addresses
the requirement that the court also detennine that the costs should be awarded against NIR in the
interests of justice.
In addition to the required finding that discretionary costs be necessary, exceptional, and
reasonably incuned, the trial court must also find that the costs "should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). This Court has provided guidance to the
trial courts in what facts should be considered when determining if a discretionary cost should be
assessed against a party in the interests of justice:
In determining whether an award of attorney fees is in the interest of justice,
a court should consider the overall conduct of the lawsuit and balance that
conduct against the American Rule, which presumes that each party is
responsible for their own attorney fees and costs. See Caldwell v. Idaho Youth
Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 P.2d 215, 222 (1998). Factors to consider include
but are not limited to the merits of the lawsuit and whether or not it was pursued
frivolously, see I.R.C.P. 11; the relationship of the costs incmTed to the final
disposition of the proceeding, and the value added to the proceeding by the costs
incuned, see Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475,
36 P.3d 218,227 (2001); the necessity of the proceedings to the final resolution of
the lawsuit; and the behavior of the parties, and whether they needlessly ran up
costs and fees. Justice is not dependent upon one's wealth or ability to pay costs;
as such, this is one factor that should not be considered in this analysis.

Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 915-16, 303 P.3d at 602-03 (emphasis added). This Court also

instructed that the beginning point of analysis is "the presumption that it is in the interest of
justice for each party to pay their own costs unless the overall conduct of the lawsuit indicates
otherwise." Id. Despite the Hoagland case being complicated, this Court held "the district court
failed to demonstrate that an award of discretionary costs was in the interest of justice, or if so,
why?" Id.
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In this case, the district court never engaged in the analysis this Comt mandated in the

Hoagland case. The memorandum decision and order granting discretionary costs never
addresses why the interests of justice would require an award of discretionary costs against NIR.
Instead, the language of Rule 54( d)(l )(D) is simply copied and pasted into conclusory statements
that"[certain discretionary costs claimed by Valiant] were necessary and exceptional, reasonably
incmred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the defendants." R Vol. XLVIII,
pp. 5839-5841. The only time the district comt even approaches addressing the interests of
justice in its discretionary costs award, it fails to specify which of the defendants ought to bear
the costs associated with the questionable activity being described. For example, the district
cmut reasoned that at several of the hearings in Sandpoint, Idaho "counsel for one or more of the
defendants presented oral arguments not supported by any legal authority or raised issues and
claims that had already been determined on summary judgment" and therefore, the court
awarded travel costs to Valiant. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. If the comt intended to determine that
certain behavior of the pruties needlessly ran up costs and fees, the comt should have specified
what paity, what behavior, and what associated costs and fees were needlessly created or run up.
Instead, the court made a vague characterization and held each defendant responsible for a whole
category of fees (e.g. travel costs). If for example only one of the three defendants engaged in
such activity, it makes no sense that each should be penalized with an award of discretionary
costs. Yet Valiant represents to this Comt "the district comt's dete1mination was based at least
in pait upon the conduct ofNIR." Respondent's Brief, 16. However, the district comt's
memorandum decision awai·ding the discretionary costs provides no support for this contention.
Valiant also claims without any support that the distdct comt's award was based upon
"unnecessary waste of time" and/or "unnecessary costs'that could have been easily avoided" and
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attributable to NIR. Id. at 17. Again, there is no support for this contention in the district court's
award. The same vague overgeneralization was made by the district court with respect to
outsourced photocopy expenses, in-house photocopy expenses, postage expenses, courier costs,
telephone expenses, and cost of computer-assisted research. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5 841. The district
court simply failed to make any findings or provide any explanation why the interests of justice
would require an award of discretionary costs to be made against NIR, rather than against the
other defendants, or simply not at all. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in
awarding discretionary costs against NIR.

C.

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT VALIANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE
DISCRETIONARY COSTS ARE EXCEPTIONAL DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE CASE WHEN VALIANT NEVER MADE THAT ARGUMENT BELOW
AND THE DISTRICT COURT NEVER MADE SUCH FINDING
In effect conceding NIR's position that none of the discretionary costs awarded against

NIR are inherently exceptional in a commercial foreclosure action, Valiant now asks the Court to
uphold the district court's award of discretionary costs because the foreclosure action itself was
exceptional. Respondent's Brief, 15. Indeed, Valiant makes considerable effort to set forth each
of the findings the district court could have made to support a conclusion that this case is
exceptional in nature.

However, the district court made none of those findings and never

concluded that this case was exceptional in nature. More impmiantly, Valiant never argued below
the action as a whole was exceptional because of its complexity, and therefore, this Court should
decline to consider that argument on appeal.
This Comi has held "Appellate comi review is 'limited to the evidence, theories and
arguments that were presented ... below."' Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57,
137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) citing State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469, 872 P.2d 728, 731 (Idaho
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App.1994). Thus, when an argument is raised for the first time on appeal it will not be considered
by this Court. Id.
Valiant never argued below that its foreclosure action was exceptional simply because of
the complexity of the action. While it is true that Valiant did claim "the sheer size, scope and
complexity" of the foreclosure action resulted in necessary and exceptional expenses, it never
argued that the sheer size, scope and complexity of the case made the case itself exceptional, such
that all of its costs are exceptional. R Vol. XLI, p. 5052. To the contrary, the only argument
expressly made by Valiant below for why its costs are exceptional is because of the frivolous
actions of the defendants. R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. Before that express argument was made, Valiant
simply contended that the discretionary costs should be awarded because they were necessary and
not otherwise provided as costs as a matter of right. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5053. Valiant's
argument based on frivolity was squarely rejected by the district court. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5837.
Because Valiant never argued below that the scope and complexity of its foreclosure action made
the case itself exceptional, this Court should decline to consider the same argument on appeal.
Even if this Court does consider Valiant's argument that its costs were exceptional because
of the complexity of the foreclosure action, the Court should reject that argument because it is
unsupported by the district court's award of discretionary costs. Section B.3. above addresses the
district court's failure to make any express findings that the complexity of the foreclosure action
rendered the entire action exceptional pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Therefore, even if Valiant
believes the complexity of the case rendered it exceptional, the district court did not make the same
determination. The district court's reasoning for awarding the discretionary costs is apparent in
its decision:
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice,
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because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a
matter of right."

R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 583 9-40 (emphasis added). The district court never found that the foreclosure
action was exceptional. Thus, this Court should reject Valiant's argument that the discretionary
costs it was awarded were exceptional by virtue of the nature of the action because the district
comt never made any such finding.
Valiant' s attempt to convince this Court that the underlying case was so complex it was
exceptional is not only irrelevant because the district court m~ver reached such conclusion, but it
is also simply inaccurate and unsupported by law.
There are no recorded Idaho opinions that NIR is aware of that state a complex case is
always exceptional for purposes of a discretionary costs award. To the contrary, this Court has
held that it is an abuse of discretion to award discretionary costs without first stating why the
circumstances of a case render it exceptional:
In Hoagland, this Court set forth factors a district court should consider when
determining whether costs are exceptional: ''whether there was unnecessary
duplication of work, whether there was an unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity
of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary cost that could have been easily
avoided. Most importantly, however, a court should explain why the
circumstances of a case render it exceptional."
Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214, 1229 (2016), reh 1g denied (Mar. 31, 2016)
citing Hoaglandv. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900,914,303 P.3d 587,601 (2013) (emphasis added).

Valiant's contention that a multi-patty foreclosure action of nearly 200 acres of real
property encumbered by multiple m01tgages is so complex that any associated cost would be
exceptional has no legal supp01t. In the Easterling case this Court held that a discretionary cost
award of nearly fifty thousand dollars for expert witness fees was an abuse of discretion because
the district court failed to "provide an explanation" for why the expert witness fees were
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exceptional. Id. The fact that Easterling case was complex (a medical malpractice case involving
both complex injury and complex treatment) and expert witness fees were necessary was simply
not enough. In that case, the district court found "Easterling failed to timely identify a retained
causation expert and provided misleading information about the treating physicians' opinions on
causation, and those decisions exacerbated costs incurred by Kendall." Id. However, the award
was still an abuse of discretion because the district court "failed to provide an explanation for how
Easterling's discovery decisions made Kendall's expert witness fees exceptional." Id. According
to this Court, what the district court failed to explain in that case was "how Easterling's discovery
decisions transformed normal costs of malpractice defense---expert witness fees and expensesinto exceptional ones." Id.
The same shortcoming in the Easterling case is present in this case: there has been no
explanation how the actions ofNIR have transformed the normal costs into exceptional ones.
The district court's award of discretionary costs for a litigation guarantee is the perfect
example of the district court's abuse of discretion. Valiant contends, without providing any
authority, that a litigation guarantee is an exceptional cost in a mortgage foreclosure action. Recent
statements by this Comt would indicate otherwise. Sims v. ACI Northwest., Inc., 157 Idaho 906,
342 P.3d 618, 627 (2015) (J. Jones, J., concmring) (obtaining a litigation guarantee prior to
commencing foreclosure action is doing due diligence); Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d
907,914 (2015) (obtaining a litigation guarantee is a simple step to avoid confusion about interests
in the property). The dish-ict comt's memorandum decision and order never explained how the
actions of NIR (or any other defendant) necessitated the litigation guarantee, much less
u·ansformed that normal cost into an exceptional one. The record clearly shows the cost for the
litigation guarantee was incurred no later than July 18, 2014. R Vol. XLIII, p. 5257. Valiant's
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foreclosure action was not filed until August 21, 2014. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. NIR did not answer
that action until September 19, 2014. R Vol. VII, pp. 860-873. Thus, there is no logical explanation
how Valiant' s actions could have necessitated the expense of obtaining a litigation guarantee. The
district court's award fails to provide any explanation, nor can Valiant. The same is true of every
other discretionary cost awarded against NIR. The district court never "explain[ed] why the
circumstances of [this] case render it exceptional" or what actions of NIR transformed normal
costs into exceptional ones.

Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding

discretionary costs against NIR.

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING CERTAIN
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AGAINST NIR
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(A) provides "costs are allowed as a matter of right to

the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the Court." "The award of costs as a
matter of right.. .is subject to the trial court's discretion." Great Plains Equip., Inc., 136 Idaho at
474, 36 P.3d at 226. When reviewing a court's discretionary award this Court engages in the
following analysis:
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its determination
through an exercise of reason.
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAm., Inc., 128 Idaho 851,857,920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996).
NIR has challenged the district court's award of certain costs as a matter of right against
NIR because the award against NIR was not reached through an exercise of reason. The district
court awarded costs as a matter of right in the total amount of $9,014.99 to Valiant against NIR,
VP, and N collectively. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838. The district court then apportioned that award
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between the parties, assessing one-quarter of the award against NIR because "NIR participated in
pre- and post-trial motion practice, but not in the court trial." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5 841.
NIR contends that certain of the costs of a matter of right for which NIR was partially
assessed have nothing to do with NIR and should have been excluded from the amount from which
NIR would be responsible. For instance, the Couit awarded a total amount of $86.00 for couit
filing fees, despite the fee for filing a third party complaint only being $14.00. R Vol. XLVIII, p.
5838; R Vol. XLIII, p. 5122; compare Appendix A ofIRCP, fee category K.3.
The court also assessed 25% of certain costs against NIR even though those costs were
incurred after NIR was no longer an active patty in the action. For instance, the district couit
awarded 25% of the total $8,250,19 awarded for depositions taken although NIR did not
participating in the depositions of Charles Reeves, Annette Brule, Richard Lynskey, Casey
Linscott, or Barney Ng. R. Vol. XLIII, pp. 5220-5225. The district court also included in its award
of deposition costs the deposition cost for deposing Charles Reeves in a different action, which
could not have been a cost as a matter of right in this action. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838; compare R
Vol. XLIII, p. 5126. This is even more puzzling because the district court at least acknowledged
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 cannot be interpreted "as authorizing an award to Valiant in this
case of the fees and costs it incurred in the other Idaho Club Lawsuits." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5831.
These awards against NIR evidence a failure by the district court to exercise reason in its award of
costs as a matter of right against NIR.
Lastly, the district court awarded trial witness fees, fees for certified copies of trial exhibits,
and costs of preparing trial exhibits against NIR, despite the fact that NIR did not participate in
trial. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838; compare XLVIII, p. 5841 (recognizing NIR did not patticipate in
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trial). These awards also evidence the trial court's failure to exercise reason in its award of costs
as a matter of right against NIR.
Even the trial court's decision to apportion the cost award against NIR by a factor of 0.25
lacks reason because there was never any explanation how that factor was decided. It appears to
be completely arbitrary, especially considering each cost award could have been analyzed and
compared to the actions and conduct of each of the defendants and apportionment made on a more
granular scale to adequately reflect responsibility for each cost. Yet, the district court simply
determined that each defendant would bear the costs, but NIR's responsibility would be reduced
by an arbitrary percentage. The district court abused its discretion in awarding costs as a matter
of right against NIR when those costs had no relationship to NIR's involvement, or lack thereof,
in the action at the times the costs were incun-ed.
Valiant contends that NIR's challenge to these ce1tain costs as a matter of right should be
rejected by the Court because NIR did not "cite to any case law, statute, treatise
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other legal

authority to support its position." Respondent's Brief, 21. However, NIR cited to the Rule itself,
provided the Court with the standard of review for discretionary awards of costs (which is derived
from case law) and argued that it was an abuse of discretion to assess costs against a party what
was not an active participant in the case when the costs were incun-ed. NIR did identify pertinent
factual bases for its argument, although without direct citation to the record. Accordingly, this
Court should reject Valiant's invitation to ignore NIR's substantive issue and argument, simply
because it was not accompanied with extensive secondary legal authority and multiple citations to
the record. The petiinent facts and principles are simple and clear: NIR was assessed costs for
potiions of the actions in which it did not have any involvement. The district court acknowledged
the same, and even made an arbitrary apportionment to attempt to reflect that limited involvement.

24

However, the arbitraTy nature of the apportionment and the fact that it still assessed NIR with
portions of costs incmTed when NIR had no involvement in the case, evidences a failure by the
district court to make the awaTd based on an exercise of reason. Therefore, the district court abused
its discretion.

E.

VALIANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
Valiant is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because this appeal is not frivolous,

umeasonable, or without foundation. Pursuant to LC. § 12-121 an award of attorney fees is
subject to the Court's discretion. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 39899 (2010). That statute only allows for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party when the
appeal "was brought or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." Thomas v.
Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,640, 132 P.3d 392,397 (2006).

NIR's appeal has not been brought frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation. NIR
has presented this Court with ample authority setting for the standards pertinent to the issues raised,
cited the Court to the relevant portions of the record supporting the issues raised and aTgument
presented, and presented good faith aTgument, supported by applicable legal standards, why the
district comt' s award of discretionaTy costs and certain costs as a matter of right against NIR was
an abuse of discretion and not in compliance with the mies of civil procedure.
Citing to the Lower Payette Ditch Companyv. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291,271 P.3d 689 (2012)
case, Valiant contends that NIR' s appeal is frivolous because it "lacks any reasoned argument and
merely asks this Court to second-guess the district court's exercise of discretion" and its arguments
are "undermined by relevant case law." Respondent's Brief, 24. NIR respectfully disagrees with
Valiant's assessment. Each of NIR's memoranda provides the court with reasoned argument,
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supported by relevant case law, setting forth why the distdct court failed to comply with the rules
of civil procedure and abused its discretion.
Valiant also contends that NIR' s sole purpose in its appeal "is merely an attempt to prolong
this litigation." Respondent's Brief, 25. Valiant contends that the miniscule award of costs
appealed by NIR compared to the overall value of the subject property precludes any meritorious
appeal by NIR. Of comse, Valiant provides the Court with no authority for this proposition, and
NIR is unaware of any. Valiant instead cites to this Court's decision in Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162
Idaho 900,407 P.3d 214,232 (2017), where the Comt awarded attorney fees against the appellant
because her arguments "were not well grounded in fact or wananted by existing law" and whose
"appeal amount[ed] to nothing more than continued delay and evasive action."

Neither

characterization is true in this case.
NIR admits it does not understand Valiant's claim that this appeal causes "NIR's Vendor's
Lien [to] continue[] to encumber the real propetty it descdbes." Respondent's Brief, 25. NIR
never raised the district court's treatment and disposition ofNIR's vendor's lien claim as an issue
on appeal, so it is unclear how Valiant characterizes this appeal of a costs award as an attempt to
"hamstring Valiant." Nevertheless, unlike the appellants in the Harvey and Wechsler cases, NIR
has not made this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Lastly, Valiant contends that NIR' s appealis unreasonable because it failed to timely object
to Valiant's memorandum of costs. As set forth above in Section A., NIR did timely object to
Valiant' s memorandum of costs and fees and Valiant even admitted the same below. R Vol.
XLVII, p. 5747 esp. n. 1. This Court should simply reject Valiant's claim for attorney fees against
NIR because NIR's appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
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II.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument, the trial court's award of discretionary costs and costs
as a matter of rights against NIR should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 2018.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

SUSANP. WEEKS
Attorneys for Appellant NIR
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